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DISPROPORTIONATE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF
ABORIGINAL PRISONERS: A CONFLICT OF LAW THAT
AUSTRALIA SHOULD ADDRESS
Megan A. Winder†
Abstract: In 2006, Australia’s Parliament banned all prisoners from voting. A
year later, Vickie Lee Roach, a female prisoner of Aboriginal descent, challenged the
blanket ban promulgated in the 2006 amendment to the Commonwealth Electoral Act of
1918 (“Electoral Act”). Vickie won, but in a limited way. The High Court found an
implied right to vote in the Australian Constitution, but held that Parliament could limit
such voting, as it did in the Electoral and Referendum Amendment of 2004 (“E & R
Amendment”), disenfranchising any prisoner serving three or more years in jail.
This Comment argues that the E & R Amendment conflicts with Australia’s
obligations under the United Nations’ International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, codified by Australia’s Racial Discrimination Act of
1975 (“RDA”). The RDA mandates that Indigenous citizens be treated equally to nonIndigenous citizens, including with respect to voting rights and opportunities to
participate in political life. The E & R Amendment disenfranchises a significant portion
of the prison population—a large percentage of which is Aboriginal. Disproportionate
disenfranchisement of this sort constitutes indirect discrimination and perpetuates racism
against Aboriginal people, preventing meaningful participation in their own communities.
To rectify the problem, Parliament should repeal the three-year disenfranchisement
provision of the E & R Amendment.

I.

INTRODUCTION

At 3:45 AM on December 14, 2002, Vickie Lee Roach and her exboyfriend were caught while committing a robbery in Mordialloc, a town in
Victoria, Australia.1 The duo stashed some stolen goods in the trunk of the
car and fled, with Vickie as driver, at speeds of up to 80 miles per hour.2
Neither Vickie nor her ex-boyfriend were licensed to drive.3 Vickie later
said she had wanted to pull over as soon as she saw the police in pursuit, but
did not because her ex-boyfriend threatened to kill her.4 At the urging of her

†
Juris Doctor expected in 2010, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Eric Schnapper for his invaluable help, Siiri Wilson for her extraordinary wisdom and
guidance, and the rest of the PacRim team for their hard work and careful editing. She would also like to
thank her family and friends for their patience and support throughout the writing process.
1
Karen Kissane, Former Delinquent Takes on Government and Wins, AGE, Aug. 31, 2007,
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/former-delinquent-takes-on-government-and-wins/2007/
08/30/1188067278024.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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ex-boyfriend, Vickie continued the high-speed escape.5 At the time of the
incident, she had alcohol, four kinds of tranquillizers, morphine, and a
cannabis-related substance in her blood.6
Vickie’s getaway ended when she struck a stopped car at a traffic
light.7 The impact engulfed both vehicles in flames.8 The 21-year-old man
in the other car suffered extensive injuries, including burns on his scalp,
face, ears, back, arms, knees, and internal organs.9 The burns covered
upwards of forty-five percent of his body, requiring several operations to
attach skin grafts and insert wires into his fingers.10
Vickie Lee Roach’s story began long before that night. At the age of
two, she was taken from her mother and her Aboriginal community.11 Like
many children of the “Stolen Generation,” she was placed with a nonAboriginal foster family.12 The Stolen Generation is the name critics have
given to the government-sanctioned program in which Aboriginal children
were forcibly removed from their parents and communities to be placed with
non-Indigenous families or orphanages that would “re-socialize” them, in
large part by eliminating traces of Aboriginal heritage.13 Vickie was raised
by foster parents and, after leaving them, became a “delinquent” and drug
addict.14 Between 1976 and 2003, she had 125 convictions or findings of
guilt from twenty-three court appearances.15
Vickie is now fifty years old. She is serving a six-year prison
sentence for negligently causing serious injury to the other driver.16 While
living in prison, she has completed a Master’s degree in professional writing
and is studying for a Ph.D. in creative writing.17 In addition to having

5

Id.
Id.
7
Kissane, supra note 1.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Jewel Topsfield, Leading the Charge, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 23, 2009,
http://www.smh.com.au/national/leading-the-charge-20090522-bia8.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
13
See PETER READ, NEW SOUTH WALES DEPT. OF ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS, THE STOLEN
GENERATIONS: THE REMOVAL OF ABORIGINAL CHILDREN IN NEW SOUTH WALES 1883 TO 1969 (1981),
available at http://www.daa.nsw.gov.au/publications/StolenGenerations.pdf.
14
See Kissane, supra note 1.
15
Id.
16
R. v. Roach (2005) V.S.C.A. 162 (Austl.) (imposing a total of six years’ imprisonment with nonparole period of four years). The judge sentenced Vickie to two years imprisonment for burglary, twelve
months imprisonment for theft, two years imprisonment for conduct endangering persons, three years
imprisonment for two counts of negligently causing serious injury.
17
See Kissane, supra note 1.
6
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published poetry and a novel, Vickie is a “peer educator” at the jail.18
Through these experiences, Vickie became educated and politically aware.19
As an adult, Vickie enrolled to vote in the Kooyong electorate,20 but
was disenfranchised in Commonwealth elections based on the length of her
prison sentence.21 Disenfranchisement is defined as the act of taking away
the right to vote in public elections from a citizen or class of citizens.22 If
Vickie were serving a one-year prison sentence, she would be eligible to
vote.23 Instead, because she is serving a sentence of greater than three years,
she is barred under the Electoral and Referendum Act of 2004 from
participating in state and federal elections during her incarceration.24 Vickie
was charged with one count of burglary, one count of theft, one count of
conduct endangering persons, and two counts of negligently causing serious
injury.25 While the judge made some of her sentences run concurrently, he
did not do so for all of them.26
Federal statutes govern elections in Australia.27 The first statute to
address felon voting rights, the 1902 Commonwealth Franchise Act,
disenfranchised individuals convicted and sentenced for any offense
punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer.28 This provision
remained substantially the same when the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 (the “Electoral Act”) was enacted, replacing the 1902 version. The
Electoral Act stood until 1983, when disqualification was amended to apply
to persons “under sentence . . . punishable . . . [by] the Commonwealth or of
the State or Territory by imprisonment for five years or longer.”29

18

Id.
Id.
20
See Australian Electoral Commission, 2007 Federal Election: Profile of the Electoral Division of
Koonyong (Jan. 10, 2007), http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/federal_elections/ 2007/Profiles/k/
Kooyong.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). The Kooyong Electorate is an eastern inner metropolitan
electorate covering an area of approximately forty-nine square kilometers in Victoria. By enrolling in this
electorate, Vickie was permitted to vote to elect members of the federal House of Representatives and the
Senate in Canberra.
21
David Brown, The Disenfranchisement of Prisoners: Roach v Electoral Commissioner & Anor–
modernity v feudalism, 32 ALT. L.J. 132 (2007).
22
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
23
Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act, 2004, No. 123
(Austl.).
24
Id.
25
R. v. Roach (2005) V.S.C.A. 162 (Austl.).
26
Id.
27
Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, No. 27 (Austl.).
28
Commonwealth Franchise Act, 1902, No. 7 (Austl.).
29
Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act, 1983, No. 144 (Austl.) omitted subsection
(4) and added the new subsection (6)(b) in these terms. The provisions were subsequently renumbered by
the Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act, 1984, and became section 93(8)(b).
19
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In 2004, Parliament amended the Electoral Act and its five-year prison
term requirement for voting disqualification, through passage of the
Electoral and Referendum Amendment (“E & R Amendment”).30 The E &
R Amendment demarcated a different enfranchisement line; namely,
disenfranchising prisoners serving three years or more.31 Parliament thought
the three-year ban appropriate to disallow felons from voting for at least one
scheduled federal election cycle.32 In 2006, a conservative Parliament again
amended the Act, enacting section 93(8AA) of the Electoral Act, providing
that a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment for an offense
against any law is not entitled to vote in any federal election.33 In September
2007, the High Court of Australia34 heard a challenge to the blanket ban on
disenfranchisement imposed by the amendments.35 Vickie Lee Roach
launched the challenge.36
In Roach v. Electoral Commissioner, the High Court, by a 4-2
majority,37 held that the 2006 Amendments were inconsistent with the
system of representative democracy established by the Constitution.38 The
High Court held that voting in elections stands at the heart of a system of
representative government.39 Disenfranchisement of a group of adult
citizens, without a “substantial reason,” is arbitrary and inconsistent with
such a system.40 While the 2006 Amendment was invalid, the High Court
specifically held that the 2004 E & R Amendment disqualifying prisoners
serving sentences of three years or more was valid and remained operative.41

30

Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures), 2005, No. 95

(Austl.).
31

Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act, 2004, No. 123

(Austl.).
32

Senate Deb. Hansard 24 June 2004, p. 25136.
Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act, 2006, No.
65 (Austl.).
34
About the Court, HIGH CT. OF AUSTL., Jan. 2, 2010, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2010). The High Court of Australia, which consists of a chief justice and six associate
justices, is the country's supreme court and the final court of appeal for both the federal and state court
systems.
35
Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.).
36
Id.
37
Id. (Callinan, J. did not take part in the decision).
38
See id. ¶ 92.
39
Id. ¶ 80.
40
Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162, ¶ 7 (Austl.).
41
Id.
33
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Roach argued that constraints derived from the text and structure of
the Constitution rendered the blanket ban invalid.42 The majority of the
High Court of Australia found that the right to vote existed implicitly in the
text of the Constitution itself.43 Chief Justice Gleeson, in his majority
opinion, concluded that sections seven and twenty-four of the Constitution,
which require senators and members of the House of Representatives to be
“directly chosen by the people,” mandated universal suffrage.44 Chief
Justice Gleeson further expounded that representative government has
evolved, rendering sections seven and twenty-four as a “constitutional
protection of the right to vote.”45 In so finding, however, the Chief Justice
left open the possibility that Parliament may create exceptions to the
universal suffrage mandate that fit within the bounds of the Constitution.46
In fact, the Chief Justice stated:
[T]he franchise is critical to representative government, and lies
at the centre of our concept of participation in the life of the
community, and of citizenship, disenfranchisement of any
group of adult citizens on a basis that does not constitute a
substantial reason for exclusion from such participation would
not be consistent with choice by the people.47
Determining that franchise is crucial to Australian citizenship was simply the
first step.
With this in mind, the joint majority came up with a test to determine
whether the blanket ban had a nexus between the disqualification criterion
and the original conduct that evinced culpability incompatible with
participation in the electoral process.48 The test required determining
whether the impugned legislation impermissibly limited the operation of the
system of representative government mandated by the Constitution.49 A
disqualification was only permissible if a “substantial reason” existed for
such action.50 The joint majority further defined “substantial reason” as any
disqualification reasonably appropriate or adapted to serve an end that is

42
Written Submission of Plaintiff at 2, Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.)
(H.C.A. May 9, 2010) (No. M19).
43
Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.).
44
See AUSTL. CONST., §§ 7, 24.
45
Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.).
46
Id. ¶ 6.
47
See id. ¶ 7 (citing McGinty v. Western Australia (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, ¶ 29 (Austl.)).
48
See id. ¶ 83.
49
See id. ¶ 84.
50
Id. ¶¶ 83, 85.
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“compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system
of representative government.”51
The High Court determined that the 2006 blanket ban operated
without regard to culpability other than that which may be attributed to
prisoners in general.52 This ultimately led the High Court to conclude that
the “net of disqualification [was] cast too wide”53 because it went “beyond
what is reasonably appropriate or adapted (or ‘proportionate’) to the
maintenance of representative government.”54 In striking down the blanket
ban disenfranchising prisoners, the majority implied that the mere fact of
imprisonment does not necessarily indicate criminal conduct serious enough
to warrant exclusion from such a fundamental right of citizenship.55 Despite
reaching this conclusion, the High Court held that the legislation in place
prior to the 2006 amendments remained valid and continued to apply.56
Accordingly, any Australian serving a sentence of three or more years for an
offense against the federal government is not entitled to vote.57 Thus, while
Roach’s challenge was successful in that a majority of the High Court
accepted that an implied right to vote existed in the Constitution and the
blanket ban was unconstitutional, Vickie herself was personally unsuccessful
because her sentence put her on the wrong side of the line drawn by the High
Court. By reverting back to the three-year provision, the High Court’s
decision potentially creates several conflicts of law, and allows for the
continuation of a public policy that disproportionately affects Aboriginal
persons.
This Comment argues that the reversion to the three-year sentencing
cutoff under the E & R Amendment violates the Racial Discrimination Act
[of] 1975 (“RDA”)58 by indirectly discriminating against Aboriginal people
and that Parliament should repeal the three-year sentencing cutoff, so as not
to disenfranchise prisoners. Part II provides context for voting rights, as
well as historical background supporting the idea that Aboriginal prisoners
are disproportionately disenfranchised. Part III discusses the indirect
discrimination analysis that the High Court should use in determining that

51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162, ¶¶ 83, 85 (Austl.).
See id.
Id. ¶ 95.
Id.
See id. ¶ 9, 23.
See id. ¶¶ 97-101.
Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act, 2004, No. 123

(Austl.).
58

Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, No. 52 (Austl.).
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the E & R Amendment should be struck down. Finally, Part IV argues that
Parliament should remove prisoner voting restrictions altogether, thus
streamlining the provisions governing prisoner voting rights.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The History of Aboriginal Voting Rights in Australia

Over time, there has been a progression of political inclusion making
voting a constitutional right shared by Aboriginal people.59 During the
period from 1890 to 1940, biological racism was prevalent in Australia and
“[n]on-European blood imposed a permanent barrier to admission into
Australian society.”60
The first federal Parliament passed the
Commonwealth Franchise Act in 1902, granting universal adult suffrage to
both men and women, but explicitly excluded any Aboriginal Australians not
previously enfranchised by the states in which they resided.61 In 1949, the
Electoral Act was amended to provide Aboriginal persons with voting rights
at the Commonwealth level in cases where they had previously acquired it at
the state level.62 Finally, in 1967, Aboriginal people in Australia were
granted full citizenship and gained the right be to be included in the national
census.63
1.

Voting in Australia Goes Beyond an Implied Constitutional Right—It
Is Also Compulsory

The right to vote was not among the rights explicitly articulated in the
Constitution.64 Often described as a “Washminster” system, Australian

59

See Michael Murphy, Representing Indigenous Self-Determination, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 185, 188

(2008).
60

ANDREW MARKUS, AUSTRALIAN RACE RELATIONS: 1788-1993 111 (1994).
See Commonwealth Franchise Act, 1902, No. 8 § 4 (Austl.).
62
JOHN CHESTERMAN & BRIAN GALLIGAN, CITIZENS WITHOUT RIGHTS: ABORIGINES AND
AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP 8 (1997).
63
MICHAEL BANTON, INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 281 (1996). The
Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967 was a referendum that amended § 51 of the Constitution and
removed § 127 from the Constitution. Section 51 stated that the Federal Government had the power to
make laws with respect to “the people of any race, other than the Aboriginal race in any State, for whom it
is deemed necessary to make special laws.” The referendum removed the phrase “other than the Aboriginal
race in any State,” giving the Commonwealth the power to make laws specifically to benefit Aboriginal
people. The referendum also removed § 127, which said: “In reckoning the numbers of the people of the
Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, Aboriginal natives shall not be counted,”
thus providing that Aboriginal people could be counted in census data.
64
See AUSTL. CONST.; see also JEROME DAVIDSON, DEPT. OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVS., INSIDE
OUTCASTS: PRISONERS AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AUSTRALIA (2004).
61
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constitutional law was influenced by a blend of American and British
practices.65 For instance, the Australian constitution includes the American
practices of federalism and separation of powers, combined with a written
constitution, but, like the British system, it has no Bill of Rights.66 From
inception, the Australian Constitution gave power primarily to the federal
Parliament to create and change the laws of the land.67 This power includes
mediating conflicts between two existing laws, like issues with voting in
federal elections.68
The Constitution requires a system of representative government.
Section seven, dealing with the composition of the Senate, and section
twenty-four, providing for the composition of the House of Representatives,
both require that the respective members be “directly chosen by the
people.”69 The High Court has held that these provisions provide a system of
representative government.70
Australian electoral law primarily derives from two sources, the
Constitution and the Electoral Act. The Australian right to vote is implied in
the Constitution.71 Voting is also compulsory72 for all eligible Australian
citizens.73 Although the Constitution provides for the basic legal framework
for representative government at the federal level, the Electoral Act provides
supplementary assistance for the conduct of federal elections.74 In effect, it
provides the legal basis for the administration of elections, including the
creation and maintenance of an electoral roll.75 However, the Constitution
makes only general provisions regarding electoral rights and the judiciary

65

Timothy Vines, An Australian Constitutional Experience, Vol. II CROSS-SEC. J. 167, 168 n.2

(2006).
66

Jason L. Pierce, A Sketch of Australian Constitutional History, 10 GREENBAG 327, 342 (2007).
See Gerard Carney, The High Court and the Constitutionalism of Electoral Law, in REALISING
DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 170, 171 (Graeme Orr et al. eds., 2003).
68
See Pierce, supra note 66.
69
See AUSTL. CONST., §§ 7, 24.
70
Attorney-General (Ex. Rel. McKinlay) v. The Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 1, 55-56 (Austl.)
(Stephen J.); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 137-38,
150, 168, 184-85, 210-11, 229 (Austl.); Langer v. The Commonwealth (1996) 186 C.L.R. 302, 304
(Austl.).
71
See Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.).
72
Commonwealth Electoral Office Act, 1924, No. 10 (Austl.) (mandating compulsory voting).
73
See SCOTT BENNETT, DEPT. OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVS., COMPULSORY VOTING IN AUSTRALIAN
NATIONAL ELECTIONS (2008).
74
PAMELA R. DUDGEON & PATRICIA M. HINCKS, AUSTRL. ELECTORAL COMM’N, DEMOCRACY
RULES: AN ELECTORAL EDUCATION RESOURCE 7 (2007), available at http://www.aec.gov.au/
pdf/education/ resources/democracy_rules/Teacher_Guide_by_section/Introduction.pdf.
75
Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, No. 27, § 7 (Austl.); see also Australian Electoral
Commission webpage, http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
67
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has been reluctant to read new, explicit rights into the Constitution’s text. As
a result, courts rarely subject electoral laws to judicial review on rights
grounds,76 and thus electoral law is more a product of Parliamentary creation
than judicial molding.
The compulsory nature of voting deeply affects Aboriginal people in a
system of representative government.77 Compulsory voting attempts to
ensure that all qualified citizens have a say in the operation of their
government.78
When Aboriginal people are disenfranchised
disproportionately, their government of elected officials no longer
adequately represents them.
2.

Australian History Indicates that Felon Disenfranchisement Is
Ineffective as a Punishment

Felon disenfranchisement laws date back to ancient Greece and Rome,
as well as Medieval Europe, when offenders were banished from the
community as part of their “civil death,” which often included the loss of
property rights and the ability to pass property to their heirs.79 As early as
1915, Australian residency qualifications were used to deny all prisoners the
right to vote.80
Until 1983,81 persons sentenced, or even subject to be sentenced, for
an offense punishable by imprisonment for one or more years could not
vote.82 From 1983 to 1995, any person who was convicted and was under
sentence for an offense punishable by imprisonment for five or more years
was disenfranchised.83 From 1995 to 2004, a prisoner actually had to be

76
Graeme Orr, Bryan Mercurio & George Williams, Australian Electoral Law: A Stocktake, 2
ELECTION L.J. 383, 384 (2003).
77
Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act, 1983, No. 144, § 23 (Austl.).
78
JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL MATTERS, PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA, THE 2004 FEDERAL ELECTION: REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE 2004
FEDERAL ELECTION AND MATTERS RELATED THERETO ch. 8, § 40 (2005) [hereinafter FEDERAL ELECTION
2004].
79
Courtney Artzner, Note, Check Marks the Spot: Evaluating the Fundamental Right to Vote and
Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States and Canada, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 423, 427 (2007);
see also JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING
THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/FVR/fd_losingthevote.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
80
Sandey Fitzgerald, Ending Felon Disenfranchisement—What Voting Rights Should Prisoners
Have?, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT OF AUSTL., July 7, 2005, at 2 n.8, http://arts.anu.edu.au/ democraticaudit/
papers/200507_fitz_felons.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
81
Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act, 1983, No. 144, § 23 (Austl.).
82
Id.
83
Id.
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serving five or more years to suffer disenfranchisement.84 From 2004 to
2006, Parliament reduced the threshold to three years.85 In 2006, the
Electoral Act was amended to provide that prisoners serving any sentence
were disqualified from voting in federal elections.86 The decision in the
Vickie Lee Roach case declared the 2006 Amendment unconstitutional,
effectively reinstating the three-year sentencing cutoff.87 Today, voting is no
longer a privilege held by a select few, but a right and obligation possessed
by all mentally competent adults—except those serving a prison term of
three or more years.88
3.

Aboriginal Voting Rights Are Critical to Self-Determination

Aboriginal enfranchisement supports democracy and legitimizes the
elected government.
Australia’s history of discrimination89 against
Aboriginal people through political, social, and economic means is
substantial.90 The primary historical justification for denying Aboriginal
people the right to vote was their “lack of civilization.”91 During the
twentieth century, in certain states with significant Aboriginal populations
such as Queensland and Western Australia, fears surfaced that the large
number of potential Aboriginal voters might threaten white dominance at the
ballot box.92
Aboriginal people have lacked political rights for centuries.93 One
major impediment to expansion of Aboriginal rights was that expansion
proposals failed to muster consensus among the majority non-Indigenous
population.94 Accordingly, changes in Aboriginal rights tended to mirror

84
This is a minor, but potentially important distinction from those who could be sentenced to prison
and those who were actually sentenced to prison.
85
Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act, 2004, No. 123
(Austl.).
86
Prime Minister John Howard’s party had control of Parliament. Electoral and Referendum
Amendment Act, 2006 §§3, 4 (Austl.).
87
Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.).
88
The Constitution delineates who may and may not vote broadly.
89
See HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, FACE THE FACTS (2005 ed.),
available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial_discrimination/face_facts/index.html.
90
See Australia Apology to Aborigines, B.B.C., Feb. 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7241965.stm (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
91
See Murphy, supra note 59, at 188.
92
See CHESTERMAN, supra note 62, at 13.
93
See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.) (recognizing that native title exists).
94
See CHESTERMAN, supra note 62, at 13.
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changes in the composition of the national government.95 Few voices have
spoken assertively for Aborigines. The legitimacy of an election stems from
the fact that the government is elected by a majority of the population.96 For
Aboriginal people to enact change and truly participate, they must have their
own voice—the power to vote as a unified population.
The
disenfranchisement of so many Aborigines impedes the Constitution’s goal
of a democratically elected government.
Aboriginal voting rights are critical to self-determination and
participation in government. Securing fundamental rights for all Aboriginal
people in Australia is reinforced by reference to human rights principles that
are already part, or are becoming part, of international law.97 Generally, the
issue of disenfranchisement is not one of major public interest, suggesting
that political parties are going to be the only way to instigate change.98
Enfranchisement in Australia, similar to the United States, is an issue that
splits along party lines.99 The rights of the convicted prisoner will be
influenced by who has a majority in Parliament. In this light, the catch-22
facing Aboriginal prisoners becomes apparent: the Aboriginal people have
been disproportionately excised from the voting populace by being
imprisoned at a much higher rate, yet voting is the strongest means available
in a democracy to secure their own self-determination.
B.

By Ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination and Enacting the RDA, Parliament Provided for Equal
Treatment of Aboriginals

Australia has struggled with discrimination since its colonization.100
In order to combat such discrimination, the Australian Parliament has
enacted a number of different measures to tackle issues such as racial
discrimination, sex discrimination, and disability discrimination.101 Among
this legislation, Australia ratified the International Convention on the

95
Viniyanka Prasad, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Flexible Approach
to Addressing the Unique Needs of Varying Populations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 297, 305 (2008).
96
See FEDERAL ELECTION 2004, supra note 78.
97
S. James Anaya, Panel, Divergent Discourses about International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
237, 241 (2005).
98
See Fitzgerald, supra note 80.
99
Id.
100
See READ, supra note 13.
101
Racial Discrimination Act, 1974, No. 52 (Austl.); Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, No. 4 (Austl.);
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) on September
30, 1975.102
By ratifying the CERD, Parliament agreed to work towards
eliminating discrimination within Australia. The CERD requires states to
guarantee the right to vote—including the right to participate in elections
and to stand for election—to everyone, without distinction as to race.103 The
CERD also obliges states to amend, rescind, or nullify any laws that have the
effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination, or of strengthening
racial division.104 To fulfill its obligations under the CERD, Australia passed
the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 (“RDA”). In doing so, Australia
pledged to:
[R]eview government, national and local policies, and to
change, or abolish, laws and regulations which create or
continue racial discrimination; [and to] . . . take any special
measures needed to make sure that disadvantaged racial groups
have full and equal access to human rights and to basic
freedoms; and . . . [to] tackle the prejudices that lead to racial
discrimination, and to eliminate the barriers between races.105
While Australia lacks a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights, the RDA
has provided sufficient authority to protect Aboriginal rights in other
contexts.106 For example, some of the basic rights and freedoms guaranteed
under the CERD and the RDA include: “[t]he right to be treated equally by
the courts and other tribunals, [t]he right to be protected by the government
against violence or bodily harm, [t]he right to vote and take part in
government and to have equal access to public services.”107 This suggests
that the Australian Parliament, upon enacting such legislation, intended for
Aboriginal people to be treated equally, free from discrimination.

102
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Oct. 30, 1975,
660 U.N.T.S. 195.
103
Id. art. 5.
104
Id. art. 2.
105
PILCH, HOMELESSNESS LAW AND ADVOCACY RESOURCE MANUAL: CHAPTER 2: HOMELESSNESS
AND DISCRIMINATION 16 (2008), http://www.pilch.org.au/HLARM (follow “Chapter 2—Homelessness and
Discrimination” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
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See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186 (legislative override of aboriginal title by
the Queensland Government); see also Geoffrey W.G. Leane, Indigenous Rights Wronged: Extinguishing
Native Title in New Zealand, 29 DALHOUSIE L. J. 41, 67 n.151 (2006).
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AUSTL. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, YOUR GUIDE TO THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT 4 (2006).
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THE E & R AMENDMENT HAS DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS THAT VIOLATE
THE RDA’S DEFINITION OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION

The RDA is the most significant federal protection against racial
discrimination in Australia.108 It prohibits “any act involving a distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national
or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human
right or fundamental freedom . . . .”109 Historically, anti-discrimination
legislation bans discriminatory practices on direct and indirect levels.110 On
a direct level, anti-discrimination legislation bans any discriminatory
practice that overtly differentiates by reason of some irrelevant or
impermissible consideration.111 On an indirect level, anti-discriminatory
legislation bans any action that has the same or substantially the same effect,
thus creating discrimination.112
Direct discrimination and indirect
discrimination each have distinct burdens of proof that a plaintiff must meet
in order to successfully challenge a potentially discriminatory law on RDA
grounds.113 While the E & R Amendment does not directly discriminate, it
is a prime example of legislation that discriminates indirectly.
A.

The RDA Does Not Prohibit the E & R Amendment on Direct
Discrimination Grounds

The E & R Amendment does not fit within the direct discrimination
classification of prohibited legislation. To demonstrate direct discrimination,
the plaintiff must prove that the legislation meets two requirements: 1) that
the act has “the purpose or effect” of impairing political freedom, and 2) that
the act was based on race.114 While the first prong may be met here by
demonstrating a significantly disproportionate effect on Aboriginal people,
the second prong is a stumbling block.115 There is not a clear racial basis for
the E & R Amendment, and as such, the legislation would fail to be

108

See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON OF THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT 1975 (2008 ed.).
109
Racial Discrimination Act, 1974, No. 52, § 9 (Austl.).
110
See Waters v. Public Transport Corp. (1991) 173 C.L.R. 349, 357 (Austl.).
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See HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 108.
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115
Id.
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considered directly discriminatory, pursuant to the Briginshaw test.116
Rather, the court should examine the E & R Amendment through the lens of
indirect discrimination.
The High Court has not addressed whether or not direct and indirect
discrimination are to be treated as mutually exclusive classes.117 In the
absence of such a classification, federal courts have treated them
separately.118 In fact, one such court held “that the material difference in
treatment is based on the status . . . of that person, notwithstanding an
absence of intention or motive on the part of the alleged discriminator.”119
That court further held that where a state government acting with the best of
intentions unintentionally discriminates, such action does not rise to the level
of the Briginshaw test. 120 Such is the case here.
B.

The RDA Prohibits the E & R Amendment on Indirect Discrimination
Grounds

Indirect race discrimination focuses on the effect on a person of
particular practices or policies that disadvantage them.121 In 1990, the RDA
was amended in order to provide a way to reverse legislation or individual
action that indirectly discriminates against citizens.122 According to the
amended section, 9(1A), racial discrimination is established if a condition or
requirement was imposed on a complainant that a) was not reasonable in the
circumstances, and b) had the effect of interfering with the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, by persons of [Aboriginal
descent] of any relevant human right or fundamental freedom.123 Political
rights, in particular the right to participate in elections by voting on the basis
of universal and equal suffrage, is included in the definition of human right

116
See Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R. 336, 362 (Austl.) (Dixon, J.). This case stands for
the proposition that legislation must be created in order to discriminate to be “direct discrimination,” and
that such legislation would require a higher standard of evidence to reach a state of “reasonable
satisfaction” that the legislation did in fact discriminate. In Vickie Roach’s case, the legislation is facially
neutral, and therefore does not fit the Briginshaw test or require the higher standard of evidence.
117
Australian Medical Council v. Wilson & Others (1996) 68 F.C.R. 46, 74 (Austl.).
118
Id.
119
See Waters v. Public Transport Corp. (1991) 173 C.L.R. 349, 359 (Austl.).
120
See HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 108.
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Tanevski v. Fluor Australia Pty Ltd., (2008) NSWADT 217, para. 53.
122
House of Reps. Deb. Hansard 12 November 1990, p. 3764 (statement of Peacock, MP). Section
9(1A) was added to the RDA by the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act 1990 (Austl.) which came
into effect on 22 December 1990. The secondary purpose of the amendment seems to have been to equalize
the RDA with all other discrimination statutes and allow for challenges on indirect discrimination grounds.
123
A.B. v. New South Wales (2005) 194 F.L.R. 156, 156 (Austl.).
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or fundamental freedom, according to section 9(2) of the Act.124 The
amendment further condemns any “act involving a distinction based on, or
an act done by reason of, the other person’s race, colour, descent or national
or ethnic origin.”125
The legislative purpose for amending section 9 of the RDA was to
directly address forms of discrimination that do not qualify as direct
discrimination, but that clearly have a discriminatory effect on a racial
group.126 As Mr. Melham, M.P., stated during the introduction of the
legislation, the purpose was to determine “whether the imposed term,
condition or requirement impacts disproportionately on persons of the same
race etc. . . . . [meaning] it will not be necessary to establish that every
person in that group needs to be affected to show a disproportionate
impact . . . .”127 Thus, indirect racial discrimination contrary to section 9(1A)
of the RDA is concerned with laws that are neutral on their face yet are
discriminatory in their impact and outcome.128 In order to sustain a finding
of indirect discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate two things: 1) that
the legislation unreasonably violates guaranteed Constitutional or legislative
rights, and 2) that the violation creates an adverse discriminatory effect.129
1.

Disenfranchisement Imposed by the E & R Amendment Violates the
RDA’s Guarantee of Political Rights

Disenfranchisement imposed by the E & R Amendment unreasonably
violates the RDA’s guarantee of political rights, thus meeting the first prong
of the indirect discrimination test. To determine reasonableness, the High
Court has adopted a passage speaking to section 5(2) of the Sex
Discrimination Act that the test is “less demanding than one of necessity, but
more demanding than one of convenience.”130 The Court further stated that
“the criterion is an objective one, which requires the court to weigh the

124
Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, No. 52 (Austl.). By reference to the CERD, Article 5(c): (c)
Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election-on the
basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public
affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service.
125
Id. § 9.
126
House of Reps. Deb. Hansard 12 November 1990, p. 3764 (statement of Peacock, MP).
127
House of Reps. Deb. Hansard 12 November 1990, p. 3768 (statement of Melham, MP).
128
De Silva v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 89 F.C.R. 502, 513 (Austl.).
129
Dept. of Foreign Affairs & Trade v. Styles (1989) 23 F.C.R. 251, 263 (Bowen, C.J. & Gummow,
J. analyzing the Sex Discrimination Act in the same manner that the RDA would be addressed).
130
Id.
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nature and extent of the discriminatory effect . . . against the reasons
advanced in favour of the requirement or condition on the other.”131
In determining what constitutes “reasonable,” federal courts have
looked at a variety of factors, including 1) whether the purpose of the
legislation could be achieved without employing a discriminatory
requirement, or by employing a requirement that is less discriminatory in its
impact;132 2) whether the legislation is effective, efficient and convenient;133
or 3) whether the legislation serves relevant policy objectives.134 While
proponents argue that felon disenfranchisement qualifies under these factors,
disenfranchisement is an unreasonable and ineffective punishment that is
offensive to public policy.
a.

Proponents of Felon Disenfranchisement Justify Their Argument for
the Three Year Rule on a Number of Grounds

There are a number of arguments that proponents of felon
disenfranchisement put forth to justify the diminution of the right to vote.
Some such arguments are: 1) convicted felons are not trustworthy voters (i.e.
they would vote for policies that help criminals); 2) convicted felons are not
loyal to the republic; 3) felons will participate in electoral fraud; 4) logistical
problems exist with inmate voting (i.e. in which jurisdiction would their
votes count); 5) disenfranchisement is a legitimate aspect of criminal
punishment. The final justification is the most problematic because it is the
most widely held, and likely the most supported by the public at large.135
Disenfranchisement may be seen as a legitimate aspect of criminal
punishment by certain groups and members in Parliament who may want to
appear tough on crime and criminals.136 For example, in debating the
implementation of the complete ban on prisoner voting, Mr. Nairn, MP,
stated: “people who commit offences against society sufficient to warrant a
prison term should not, while they are serving that prison term, be entitled to
vote and elect the leaders of the society whose laws they have
disregarded.”137 This sentiment is supported by other elected officials, like
131
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135
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132

APRIL 2010

DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF ABORIGINAL PRISONERS

401

Senator Eric Abetz who stated: “If you are not fit to walk the streets, as
deemed by the judicial system . . . then chances are you’re not a fit and
proper person to cast a vote in relation to the future of your country.”138 The
members of Parliament who addressed this issue in the debates were likely
swayed by the public’s distaste for allowing “killers . . . the right to vote.”139
Thus, disenfranchisement was thought to serve as a form of retribution.140
Disenfranchisement has also been proposed as a deterrent to future
crime. Prisons function within the criminal justice system “as a means to
control [the] communities [and] maintain a stable system of order.”141
Further, the commission of a crime and subsequent lawful conviction
constitute an active and deliberate repudiation of the terms of the social
contract a citizen is thought to abide by.142 Exclusion from the franchise is a
penalty that signifies the criminal’s apparent desire to no longer be
considered a member of the community in which he or she committed the
crime.143 It can thus be argued that such exclusion, and resulting
disenfranchisement, is a choice that each person must make upon deciding to
break the law.
b.

Disenfranchisement Is an Unreasonable Means to Punish Citizens

Disenfranchisement of prisoners is an inappropriate way of punishing
citizens. As one judge has noted:
Prisoners are human beings . . . . [and] are also citizens of this
country . . . . They should, so far as the law can allow,
ordinarily have the same rights as all other persons . . . . They
have lost their liberty whilst in prison . . . . [but] they have not

138
Julia Baird, A Hard Sell For More Compassion, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 17 July 2004,
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/07/16/1089694558141.html?from=storylhs# (last visited Jan. 3,
2010).
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See Pollard, supra note 135.
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Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender's Right to Vote: Background
and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 721-24 (1973) (discussing European responses to crime
through civil death, outlawry, infamy, and attainder).
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David Jacobs & Ronald E. Helms, Towards a Political Model of Incarceration: A Time Series
Examination of Multiple Explanations for Prison Admission Rates, 102 AM. J. OF SOC. 323 (1996).
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visited Jan. 3, 2010).
143
Id.

402

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 19 NO. 2

lost their human dignity or their right to equality before the
law.144
As a goal of the penal system, disenfranchisement is retributive to the
extent that the offender is deprived of something they value.145 However,
the disproportionate number of Aboriginal prisoners suggests that
disenfranchisement, through the E & R Amendment, is not appropriate or
adapted to serving a legitimate objective—namely, rehabilitation. The
statement of purpose for the revised standard Guidelines for Corrections in
Australia explicitly states that the community correctional services exist for
the purposes of: 1) providing assessment and advice to sentencing and
releasing authorities in the formulation of orders and directions for
offenders; 2) to ensure that offenders fulfill the orders and directions of
courts and releasing authorities; 3) to assist the rehabilitation of offenders
through the adoption of productive, law-abiding lives in the community; 4)
to contribute to public safety by preventing crime and through reducing
recidivism; and 5) to provide offenders with an opportunity to make
restitution to their victims or to the wider community.146 According to the
Australian Institute of Criminology, which reports directly to the Minister of
Home Affairs in the Attorney General’s office, the principles are intended to
show the spirit in which correctional programs should be administered and
the goals toward which administrators should aim.147 Nothing in the
guidelines suggest that the punishment, either pre- or post-sentencing should
serve retributive or deterrent purposes, nor does it say that the punishment
should extend beyond incarceration, which is essentially what
disenfranchisement does.148
Disenfranchisement prevents reintegration of offenders into society,
setting up a scenario where felons must abide by the law, after their lawful
conviction, without the ability to vote to protect their future interests once
out of prison.149 Further, denying prisoners the right to vote may undermine

144
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respect for the rule of law because citizens who cannot participate in the
making of laws have no incentive to recognize such authority.150 Social
policy activists have condemned the retribution justification for
disenfranchisement.151 Prisoners, like all citizens, have an interest in
political issues.152
Disenfranchisement opponents claim that “by
rationalizing and facilitating a tendency to localize the blame for crime in
the individual, disenfranchisement helps to obscure the complexity of the
roots of crime and their entanglement with contingent social structures,”
such as lack of education or poverty.153 Disenfranchisement, therefore,
prevents a nation from embracing a minority population, like the Aboriginal
population, and hinders the democratic process. Disenfranchisement, by
definition, divests prisoners of freedom and voting rights. Depriving
citizens of their freedom and voting rights occurs primarily to protect the
interests of the dominant class.154 In various jurisdictions outside of
Australia—most notably Canada and the United Kingdom—prisoner
disenfranchisement was found to not be rationally connected to
rehabilitation, and was disallowed by those nations’ courts.155
A policy of disenfranchisement of prisoners prevents full
rehabilitation because it leaves the convicted, yet rehabilitated, felon with
fewer rights than those guaranteed by full citizenship. The E & R
Amendment denies prisoners, particularly Aboriginal prisoners who are
overrepresented in the prison system, compared to the overall prison
population, the right to vote—in direct conflict with the RDA’s guarantee of
equality.
c.

The Sentence Does Not Fit the Crime with Regard to the E & R
Amendment

150
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The right to vote freely for a chosen candidate is essential in a
democratic society, and any restriction of this right undermines
representative government.156 The Commonwealth mandates that all citizens
vote, with very few limitations.157 Legitimacy of democratic governments
depends on full franchise.158 In Australia, prisoners are required to vote
unless they are serving a sentence of three or more years.159 In the case of a
disenfranchised prisoner, the crime may have had nothing to do with his or
her ability to vote. If the crime leading to conviction were related to voting
issues, such as bribery or extortion of public officials, perhaps
disenfranchisement would be an appropriate punishment. But in the current
system, a person who was not convicted of crimes involving deceit is
disenfranchised merely by virtue of the length of sentence.
There are a number of situations exemplifying the disconnect between
the type of crime and disenfranchisement imposed by legislation.160 Bribery
is a prime example, where the seriousness of the crime is not reflected in the
length of the sentence. The Electoral Act section seventy-eight states that:
“A person shall not improperly seek to influence a member of a
Redistribution Committee for a State or the Australian Capital Territory, a
member of an augmented Electoral Commission . . . in the performance of
his or her duties . . . .”161 That section also describes the penalty: 2000
dollars or imprisonment for twelve months, or both.162 Under the current
scheme of disenfranchisement for sentences of three or more years, any
person who sought to improperly influence an elected official would not lose
his right to vote. Thus, the crime need not have any connection to electoral
or political processes or to the security of the state for the prisoner to be
disenfranchised.163 Instead, a person who was not convicted of crimes
involving deceit might be disenfranchised, whereas a person who was
convicted of bribing an official could vote in every future election.164 The
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three-year ban is arbitrary and injures the political freedom guaranteed by
the RDA and implied in the Constitution.
d.

The E & R Amendment Lacks Equity and Is Fundamentally Unfair

Disenfranchisement of felons is not uniform across Australia.165 The
E & R Amendment is not applied equally across the country.166 Currently,
the same offense may carry mandatory detention in one state but not in
another, demonstrating the inconsistency of how offenders are actually
punished.167
Every Australian jurisdiction sets its own rules for the franchise.168
While some states adopt the changes to the Commonwealth franchise as a
matter of course, they are not obliged to do so.169 This discretion generates
substantial variation in prisoner qualifications for franchise among
Australian states and territories.170 This situation is further complicated by
the fact that some jurisdictions choose to disenfranchise, while others do not.
By legislating at the Commonwealth level to disenfranchise prisoners—
regardless of the effect of state law—Parliament imposes a secondary
punishment, in breach of the doctrine of federalism.171 The prisoner will not
only serve his or her sentence, but in jurisdictions that do adopt the
Commonwealth rule per se, will be disenfranchised from state and federal

165
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elections.172 Alternatively, in a state that does not adopt the Commonwealth
rule, the prisoner will not lose his or her right to vote at federal elections.173
To complicate matters further, there is no uniformity amongst the
states, or between the states and the Commonwealth, as to what constitutes
an offense punishable by imprisonment.174 For example, in Western
Australia, there is a scheme whereby persons who default on payment of
fines lose their drivers license.175 This is a stark contrast with the Australian
Capitol Territory (“ACT”) or in Queensland, where the same defaulter
would actually be imprisoned.176 In this scenario, an Australian citizen in
Western Australia who defaults on fines retains the right to vote, whereas a
citizen in ACT or Queensland who is jailed for defaulting on fines may lose
his/her federal voting rights, depending on the length of the confinement.177
In this light, the E & R Amendment appears unreasonable because its effects
are arbitrary and differ from one territory to the next.
2.

The Disproportionate Disenfranchisement Imposed upon Aboriginals
by the E & R Amendment Interferes with Their RDA-Guaranteed
Right to Participate in Elections

To demonstrate indirect discrimination, a plaintiff must establish that
there has been “adverse effect discrimination.”178
Adverse effect
discrimination is evidenced by an article of legislation that differentiates for
an irrelevant or impermissible reason, or has the “same or substantially the
same effect as if different treatment had been accorded precisely for a reason
of that kind.”179 The provisions of paragraph (c) of subsection 9(1A) of the
RDA express that any act that has the “purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of . . . any human right or
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fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life,” is prohibited.180
The disproportionate effects of prisoner disenfranchisement paint a
picture of systemic and institutionalized disadvantage. According to the
2006 census, the total Australian population was just under twenty
million.181 The Aboriginal population was approximately 510,160, or
approximately 2.5% of the total population.182 Of greater importance,
however, is the Aboriginal voting age population. In 2007, the Aboriginal
population that could, and was required to vote, was estimated to be 1.7% of
the current voting age population.183 Without every one of the votes
counted, the Aboriginal population would have difficulty creating legislative
change.
Between 2000 and 2006, the rate of Aboriginal imprisonment in
Australia rose substantially.184
Today, Aboriginal offenders are
approximately three times more likely than non-Aboriginal offenders to
receive a sentence of imprisonment, regardless of their prior history.185 This
rate of imprisonment is likely the result of a number of factors, including
socio-economic status, mental health status, education, and homelessness.186
Unfortunately, Aboriginal incarceration rates continue to increase
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disproportionately despite the efforts outlined by the Royal Commission187
in the Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Report.188
In Australia, the percentage of Aboriginal prisoners increased from
15% of the total prison population in 1993, to 24% in 2007.189 Although
felon disenfranchisement laws is justified on race-neutral grounds, the
discriminatory impact remains.190 Laws denying felons the right to vote
weaken the voting power of minority communities.191 This is significant
because minorities comprise approximately one-quarter of all convicted
offenders who are prevented from voting.192 With the sole exception of
incarceration in the state of Tasmania, an Aboriginal person is thirteen times
more likely to be imprisoned than a non-Indigenous person.193 In Western
Australia, Aboriginal persons are twenty-one times more likely to be in
prison than non-Aboriginal persons194—a staggering number, considering
the population of Western Australia is only 3.8% Aboriginal.195
Excluding prisoners with indeterminate,196 life-term, and periodicdetention sentences, in 2007, the median aggregate sentence for prisoners
was three years.197 As a result of the E & R Amendment, the median
prisoner is disenfranchised. This is particularly alarming, considering those
who were sentenced for indeterminate or life sentences did not factor into
the aggregate. The higher rate at which Aboriginal offenders are sent to
prison stems mainly from: 1) a higher rate of conviction for violent crime,
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and 2) a higher rate of re-offending, particularly following imposition of
sanctions intended as alternatives to fulltime imprisonment.198
The end result is that approximately 48% of Aboriginal prisoners are
unable to vote because of the three-year voting restriction.199
Comparatively, only about 39% of the non-Aboriginal prison population has
been disenfranchised.200 From the prison statistics alone, it is evident the E
& R Amendment has disproportionately disenfranchised Aboriginal voters.
The proportion of voting-age convicted Aboriginals is higher than their nonIndigenous counterparts. This is increasingly true in states adopting the
Commonwealth rule per se.201
Disproportionate disenfranchisement prevents Aboriginal people from
meaningfully participating in Australian politics and society as a whole.
Aboriginal people have, in the government’s own words, “less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process.”202 As of 2007, not a single Aboriginal person had been elected to
the Australian Commonwealth House of Representatives, and only two had
been elected to the Commonwealth Senate.203 The fact that Aboriginal
people lack proportional representation in elected bodies further prevents
meaningful participation.
A variety of factors relate to the over-representation of Aboriginals in
custody. The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody noted
that the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in prison was directly
related to the “whole of life” experience of Aboriginal people.204 The
Commission found that “the single significant contributing factor to
incarceration is the disadvantaged and unequal position of Aboriginal people
in Australian society in every way, whether socially, economically or
culturally.”205 By sanctioning the pattern of disadvantage and stigmatizing
Aboriginal prisoners by not allowing them to vote, the racial distinctions
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become more pronounced, pervasive, and entrenched by the politically
powerful non-Indigenous majority.206
Further, disenfranchisement does not end at the prison walls.
Theoretically, the end of a prison sentence restores the prisoner’s voting
rights. In practice, however, ex-prisoners must apply to re-enroll.207 This
leads to a variety of different problems, including the fact that many exprisoners are homeless and unable to establish a stable address.208
Additionally, the evidentiary requirements to re-enroll and dependence upon
witnesses who may be in positions of power, but who can attest to prisoner
identity, can also work against the intent of enfranchising legislation.209 As a
result of their convictions, many prisoners suffer permanent disqualification
and deregistration by default.210
Disenfranchised Indigenous minorities are uniquely situated to suffer
political injustices that have not been rectified by their unequal
representation in political and economic institutions.211 Minor parties in
Australia, such as the Greens,212 expressed concerns about the racially
discriminatory impact of removing the right to vote.213 Even in the debates,
one senator expressed doubt about such disenfranchising measures:
Firstly, it is up to the courts to judge people and penalise them
by sending them to prison. That is where the penalty should
start and finish. It should not be up to us to be legislating in a
general way to take away the rights of people who go to
prison—in particular, basic civil rights and the right to vote.214
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The statistics demonstrate that the percentage of Aboriginal people who
are incarcerated is disproportionate, and growing.215 Such findings suggest
that as conviction rates for Aboriginals rise, Aboriginal voting may decline.
The racial disparity in voting participation caused by disenfranchisement
laws will grow with time due to the current rise in Aboriginal incarceration,
coupled with the increasing number of disenfranchised Aboriginal voters.
This demonstrates the disproportionate effect the E & R Amendment has on
Aboriginal prisoners.
IV.

THE CONFLICT OF LAW BETWEEN THE E & R AMENDMENT AND THE
RDA CAN BE RESOLVED WITH CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION REPEALING
THE E & R AMENDMENT’S THREE-YEAR BAN

Two major methods exist to address conflicts of law: litigation and
legislation.216 Empowering courts with discretion to disenfranchise felons at
their sentencing seems appropriately individualized and a more legitimate
way to punish and deter, in contrast to disenfranchisement by legislation for
every prisoner serving a term of three or more years.217 However, given the
courts’ historical reluctance to expand or address prisoner enfranchisement,
Parliament should pass legislation overruling the E & R Amendment.
Parliament has the ability to rectify the current felon
disenfranchisement law. Under section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution,
Parliament has the power to make laws with respect to “[t]he people of any
race, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws.”218
Additionally, Sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution require that Parliament
be “directly chosen by the people.” While this Constitutional provision does
not guarantee individual voting rights, disenfranchising a segment of the
population is unacceptable except on incapacity grounds—such as age or
mental illness—which are both listed qualities in the text of the
Constitution.219 Neither ethnicity nor a felony conviction should qualify as
incapacity grounds. The most simple and just solution would be to dispose
of prisoner disenfranchisement. This solution would also present the most
efficient way of eliminating disparities between Aboriginal and nonIndigenous prisoners resulting from the E & R Amendment’s
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disenfranchising provision. It can be expected, however, that this potential
solution will be met with significant opposition.220
In the event that Parliament does not find the popular support to
remove felon disenfranchisement entirely, Parliament can rectify the
discrepancy between the seriousness of a crime and its sentence by
mandating that the restrictions relate directly to the crime committed.221 The
punishment should fit the crime. This option, by its very nature, would not
prove as powerful as removing the E & R Amendment’s three-year provision
outright. Vickie Roach’s case is one that would benefit from making the
punishment fit the crime. None of the crimes222 for which she was convicted
carried a three-year sentence, but as a result of the consecutive structure of
her sentences, she is nevertheless disenfranchised. As such, Parliament
should make the punishment for prisoners like Vickie fit the crimes
committed.
Parliament should take action in order to retain legitimacy in the eyes
of the world.223 Prisoner disenfranchisement is strikingly inconsistent with a
number of international human rights norms and principles.224 The rights
and interests of Indigenous peoples are evolving through the dynamic
process of international lawmaking.225 The right not to be discriminated
against on the basis of race, in a systematic way, has the legal status of jus
cogens; that is, the prohibition of systematic racial discrimination has the
legal status of a peremptory norm of law from which no derogation is
permitted.226
In contrast to the Australian High Court’s decision in the Roach
opinion, various constitutional courts have recently struck down not only
lifetime voting bans, but even the exclusion from voting of persons who are
currently incarcerated.227 For instance, in 1999, the South African

220
See Graeme Orr, Constitutionalising the Franchise and the Status Quo: The High Court on
Prisoner Voting Rights, DEMOCRATIC AUDIT OF AUSTL., Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.democraticaudit.
anu.edu.au/ papers/20071019orr_prisonervotingrights.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
221
Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 523-24 (Austl.).
222
See Roach v. Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 (Austl.).
223
See G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 art. 1, cl. 1 (Sept. 13, 2007) (stating that Australia has
not met the international standard for creating Indigenous self-determination, nor is there assimilation of
the Aboriginal people).
224
PHILIP LYNCH, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW RESOURCE CENTRE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO VOTE AND
PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 8 (2006).
225
Gillian Triggs, Australia’s Indigenous Peoples and International Law: Validity of the Native Title
Amendment Act 1998, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 372, 375 (1999).
226
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987).
227
See August v. Electoral Comm’n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Sauvé v. Canada [2002] 3
S.C.R. 519 (Can.).

APRIL 2010

DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF ABORIGINAL PRISONERS

413

Constitutional Court required that the government allow prisoners to vote,
stating:
The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and
personhood. Quite literally, it says that everybody counts. In a
country of great disparities of wealth and power it declares that
whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we
all belong to the same democratic . . . nation; that our destinies
are intertwined in a single interactive polity.228
In other jurisdictions, most notably Canada and the United Kingdom,
the disenfranchisement of prisoners was deemed not rationally connected to
the object of punishment, and the courts of those countries disallowed it for
this reason.229 A citizen’s right to vote should depend on his ability to make
a rational choice, not his prison status. Loss of voting rights has no place
within a penal system whose reform policies aim to encourage the prisoner’s
identification with, rather than his alienation from, the community at
large.230 As a result, every prisoner should be entitled to vote in all elections
concerning his community and the community should facilitate such
political participation.231
Many international legal organizations, like the United Nations and
the European Court of Human Rights, would likely support the abolition of
the three-year disenfranchisement rule.232 The U.N. Committee on Human
Rights has stated that the Committee “fails to discern the justification for
such a practice in modern times, considering that it amounts to an additional
punishment and that it does not contribute towards the prisoner’s
reformation and social rehabilitation.”233 In the event that Parliament does
not correct this conflict of law, the High Court’s hands are tied until the next
228

See August v. Electoral Comm’n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) ¶ 17 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J.).
See Sauvé [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.); Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. at 41
(U.K.). It should be noted that unlike the Roach case in Australia, both the Canadian Supreme Court and
the European Court of Human Rights found that there was an express right to vote in the country’s
Constitution.
230
Justice Peter Nagle & Richard Summerell, Report of the Royal Commission into New South
Wales Prisons, Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (1978).
231
Id.
232
See Sarah Pritchard, Approaching its Use-by Date? National Enforcement Mechanisms: the Case
of Australia, in Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives 368 (Titia Loenen & Peter R.
Rodrigues eds., 1999). Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),
for example, recognizes an Aboriginal citizen’s right to take part in public affairs, to vote and be elected,
and to have access to public service.
233
U.N. Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political. Rights, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ¶ 10, CCPR/CO/73/UK;
CCPR/CO/73/UKOT (Dec. 6, 2001).
229

414

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 19 NO. 2

challenge is brought, and even then constitutional avoidance may be
possible, unless the two laws are at issue.234
V.

CONCLUSION

Vickie Lee Roach personifies convicted individuals who have been
improperly, undemocratically, and systematically disenfranchised. The E &
R Amendment’s ban indirectly discriminates against Aboriginal people,
because it has a discriminating effect that does not justify the status quo.
As a result of the E & R Amendment, Aboriginal people are
disproportionately disenfranchised on a massive scale, in violation of the
RDA’s statutory guarantee of equality under the law. Parliament should
resolve the resulting conflict of law through legislation—preferably
repealing the three-year disenfranchisement provision of the E & R
Amendment.
The disproportionate disenfranchisement of Aboriginal
people—perpetuating racism and preventing the population’s meaningful
participation in Australian politics—should end.
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